本日は、最低賃金を巡る日経新聞の記事を参考に、ブログを書いてみました。
伝統的な経済学（例えば古典派）における最低賃金の考え方は、❶最低賃金が均衡賃金（＝競争市場において決まる賃金）を上回ると雇用が減少し、❷最低賃金が均衡賃金が下回ると、雇用には何の影響も与えない、というものです。なので、最低賃金の導入には否定的です。
一方で、現実世界（＝完全競争ではない市場）では、最低賃金を上げることで雇用が増えたり、（経済の新陳代謝を促進することなどを通じて）企業の生産性も向上するという考え方もあります。
一方、日本の最低賃金法（昭和34年制定）という「法」的な枠組みについても、見直しが必要になっているのかもしれません。
【English】
In traditional economic theory, the discussion of minimum wage often starts with the supply and demand model. If the minimum wage is set above the equilibrium wage, the model predicts a reduction in employment, as firms demand less labor than workers are willing to supply. Conversely, if the equilibrium wage already exceeds the statutory minimum, the policy is considered ineffective, as it does not alter labor market outcomes.
However, real-world evidence has been far less conclusive. Empirical studies across different countries and industries show mixed results. The impact of minimum wage depends heavily on the structure of the labor market—whether it is highly competitive, characterized by monopsony power, or shaped by other institutional factors.
The key policy goal of minimum wage legislation is clear: to raise the wage floor, reduce income inequality, and mitigate poverty. By setting a statutory wage floor, governments aim to ensure that work provides a minimally acceptable standard of living. Yet, this goal comes with trade-offs. When higher labor costs erode business profits, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—especially those relying heavily on part-time workers—may struggle to stay in business.
Japan’s Minimum Wage Act takes a distinctive approach. It requires that minimum wage levels be determined with reference to three criteria: (1) the cost of living for workers, (2) prevailing wage levels in society, and (3) the ability of enterprises to pay. These factors are deliberated by regional minimum wage councils composed of representatives from labor, employers, and academia. Importantly, this framework was designed to place decision-making at some distance from direct government intervention.
In recent years, however, political involvement has become more visible. Governors and cabinet ministers, who are not formally part of the tripartite councils, have publicly pressed for higher wage levels. Given that wage increases are now a matter of broad public concern, some argue that political involvement should be openly recognized.
Either way, Japan may be approaching a turning point where the institutional framework of minimum wage determination deserves renewed scrutiny.
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