Why Nations Fail(9)：The Vicious Circle

読書中の洋書 Why Nations Fail（邦題：国家はなぜ衰退するのか）の書評記事を数回に分けて書いています。

Amazon | Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty | Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A. | Economic Policy

Amazon配送商品ならWhy Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Povertyが通常配送無料。更にAmazonならポイント還元本が多数。Acemoglu, Daron,...

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9回目の今回は、第12章（Vicious Circle）を扱います。
本章では、「略奪的な仕組み（Extractive Institution）がなぜ長く続くのか」という点について様々な事例を交えて検証します。

特に、植民地支配の「略奪的な仕組み」から解放を目指して独立したにも関わらず、独立後も支配層が（鉱物）資源を私的利益のために利用し、特定エリート層に富を集中させるという「さらに悪化した略奪的な仕組み」が登場するという歴史を垣間見て、何となく暗い気持ちになりました。

【English】
In Chapter 12 of the book, titled Vicious Circle, the authors explore how extractive institutions tend to perpetuate themselves, creating a circle of inequality and underdevelopment. The authors argue that once political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few elites, they have strong incentives to maintain their dominance, often at the expense of broader societal progress. This self-reinforcing system makes institutional reform difficult, as those in power resist changes that would weaken their position.

The authors provide examples from various countries, including Sierra Leone and the U.S. South, to illustrate how extractive institutions continue to stifle growth and democracy.

The case of Sierra Leone highlights how corrupt practices and lack of accountability create a political landscape resistant to reform. Unfortunately, after independence, the government did not create inclusive institutions from scratch. Instead, it used the existing extractive institutions to govern the nation.

The same vicious circle is found in the persistence of the plantation economy in the U.S. South. After the Civil War, slavery was abolished, but new forms of extractive institutions emerged in its place. Many freed slaves did not own land and were forced to work on their former masters’ plantations for low wages. African Americans in the South continued to face economic and political oppression, and this structure remained largely unchanged until the civil rights movement of the mid-20th century.

The authors argue that breaking the vicious circle requires not only political will but also broad-based social movements that can challenge the existing power structures. Under inclusive institutions, the gains from holding political power are limited, which weakens the incentive to centralize all power.